By Jorge Costa Oliveira
Partner and CEO of JCO Consultancy
The policy of “reform and opening-up” instituted by Deng Xiaoping’s leadership created fears in more conservative sectors of the CCP that the unbridled pursuit of economic development – so well illustrated in the phrase “to get rich is glorious” – would lead to a moral and ethical regression, to a society whose citizens would be materially “rich”, yet selfish, greedy, distrustful of others, and unable to cooperate for the common good. These fears were catalysed by the entry of Western popular culture in China, leading to the launch (in 1983) of a “campaign against spiritual pollution.” The campaign was interrupted after a few months due to slowing economic growth. It then became clear that in a dilemma between “material civilization” and “spiritual civilization,” the CCP would favour the material one.
But Deng recognised the need to balance the preeminence of economic development with [the building of] a “socialist spiritual civilization” (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming, 社会主义精神文明), and the concept was mentioned in the Political Report to the 13th CCP National Congress (1987) and adopted by its leadership ever since. In April 1997, a “Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization” was established under the CCP Central Committee, formally designated as the “Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress.” In any case, the concept of “socialist spiritual civilization” has been evolutionarily densified at the whim of each leadership. In one respect, there is no change: the term “socialist” is there to remind everyone of the absolute primacy of the CCP’s interests.
During the leaderships of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the concept was maintained and an approximation was rehearsed to Confucian concepts with multiple statements by Party leaders to a “harmonious society,” “people as the basis of the state,” [calls for the promotion of] “traditional Chinese culture,” and references to the “great renaissance of the Chinese nation.” But these statements took place against a historical backdrop in which corruption kept growing and several key issues of the Chinese economy (the coming demographic fall, the real estate bubble, the financing of local governments, the poor management of the main state-owned banks) kept rising, and its solution kept being postponed, normally by throwing money at them. With the CCP’s credibility eroded, the spectre of moral and ethical regression returned, as well as the scepticism on whether citizens are motivated to feel a deep “spiritual” loyalty to the Party-State.
With the arrival of Xi Jinping to the helm (Nov 2012), a serious fight against corruption starts, as well as a gradual resolution of the key issues of the Chinese economy (still ongoing), along with a strengthening of the Party’s identification with Confucianism; expressions such as “social harmony” are used again, and the concept of “excellent traditional culture” (youxiu chuantong wenhua) is reconstructed and used for several years with the purpose of showing how the CCP, under Xi’s leadership, values traditional Chinese morals, sanctioning the role of tradition in public, political and party life, naturally accompanied by a “comprehensive and positive propaganda” that combined school education, theoretical and historical research, and the production of popular films, television shows and literature.
However, after the 20th CCP Congress (October 2022), Xi returned, in multiple speeches, to the concept of “socialist spiritual civilization.” “The long-standing and rich Chinese civilization is the foundation of contemporary Chinese culture, and a treasure trove inspiring cultural innovation,” Xi noted on several occasions. In Xi’s eyes, “China’s excellent traditional culture is the root and soul of the Chinese nation.” Xi also believes a “socialist spirituality” may be created by exposing the younger generations to the epic history of the CCP. The Party, Xi says, should “focus on telling the stories of the CCP, the revolution, and the heroes, and cultivate the love of the Party, the country, and socialism.”
Hence, when mentioning “China’s excellent traditional culture,” he also adds that “efforts should be made to adapt it to the context of a socialist society and to develop an advanced socialist culture.” That is, such efforts must always be subordinated to the dictates of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as defined by the Party-State. In a nutshell, the CCP realigns itself with the Chinese civilization heritage and societal expectations without making concessions over the ideological foundations of the Party-State.
The resurgent concept of “socialist spiritual civilization” is a powerful composite tool aimed at re-legitimising the regime, resulting from the aggregation of the Confucian cultural heritage with the Leninist component of subjection of everything and everyone to the Party-State.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the compilation of Xi’s speeches on the subject, collected in a 2023 book – “Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Exposition on the Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization (习近平关于社会主义精神文明建设论述摘编)” (2023), is now mandatory study material for CCP cadres and in all Chinese schools.
